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STEMMING THE TIDE OF EXPANDING LIABILITY:
THE COEXISTENCE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Robert L. Spell*
I.
More and more the defense of assumption of risk has come under fire by
courts and commentators alike.1 Born of the common law at the beginning of
the Industrial Revolution, assumption of risk is said to have developed as a means
of insulating the employer from the "human overhead" incident to industrialized business. 2 By shielding the employer from liability, the defense gave the
entrepreneur maximum freedom to continue the industrial expansion then sweeping the country. Expanding like the revolution for which it was born, assumption of risk soon found its way into areas other than employment3 cases, carrying
along with it the individualism inherent in the common law.
In the years since the Industrial Revolution, common law notions respecting
liability have been liberalized considerably, with expanded tort liability in virtually all areas of the law. 4 This liberalization of tort recovery already claims
as victims such defenses as the fellow servant doctrine and, for the most part,
contributory negligence. 5 The critics of assumption of risk would add this defense
to the list, and their cry of abolition is certainly consistent with the general liberalizing movement to afford plaintiffs relief where previously none existed.
However, with respect to assumption of risk, the movement has no place.
Essentially, assumption of risk "gives legal recognition to the principle that
a person who is willing to incur a potentially dangerous situation cannot later

*B.S. 1980, J.D. 1983, Mississippi College; Member, Mississippi State Bar Association; Associate, Edmonson, Biggs and Jelliffe, Jackson, Mississippi.
1. Rosenlund and Killion, Once a Wicked Sister: The Continuing Role of Assumption of Risk Under
ComparativeFault in California,20 U.S.F. L. REv. 225,225 (1986); Simons, Assumption ofRiskand Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U.L. REV. 213, 213 (1987).
2. Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1206 (1981) (quoting Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1943)); Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1,at 226.
3. Rutter, 437 A.2d at 1206.
4. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971); Simons, supra note 1,at 214.
5. E.g., Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 226. Contributory negligence remains to some extent
in varying degrees. According to one recent writing, forty-three jurisdictions have adopted some form of
comparative negligence, thus leaving seven states still applying contributory negligence. Id. at 264-65 n.233.
Moreover, according to that same writing only fourteen of the forty-three states which have adopted comparative negligence have adopted a "pure" form of comparative negligence. The remainder of the jurisdictions would apply a total bar to plaintiffs action where his fault exceeds some percentage, typically fifty
percent or fifty-one percent. Id.
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complain of injuries that arise out of that venturousness." 6 Typically, assumption of risk is said to have three elements:
(1) Knowledge on the part of the injured party of a condition inconsistent
with his safety; (2) appreciation by the injured party of the danger of the
condition; and (3) a deliberate and voluntary choice on the part of the injured party to expose his person to that danger in such a manner as to register
assent on the continuance of the dangerous condition. 7
As is evident, the cornerstone of assumption of risk is the informed choice of
the plaintiff to encounter a risk of known dangerousness. The plaintiff has elected
to act despite the potential to be harmed by defendant's conduct. Moreover,
assumption of risk is a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery. The plaintiff having made his choice to voluntarily encounter defendant's conduct and its concomitant risk of harm, the law forbids the plaintiff from later rescinding that
choice after things have turned for the worst by seeking to recover from the
defendant for his conduct.
In light of the trend liberalizing tort recovery, particularly the advent of the
fault-based concept of comparative negligence, critics of assumption of risk would
either abolish assumption of risk or merge the defense into comparative negligence. By merging the defense of assumption of risk and comparative negligence or by wholly supplanting assumption of risk with comparative negligence,
the argument goes, the "all or nothing" result of the common law inherent in
assumption of risk is mitigated, thereby distributing loss on a more equitable
basis." But does the abolition of assumption of risk result in a more equitable
system?
One of the most fundamental tenets upon which our law is based is that "the
legal system ought to leave a loss where it lies unless more good than harm
will be accomplished by shifting it."9 Indeed, it is said that this basic tenet remains "almost uniformly unchallenged." 10 Where assumption of risk is applicable,
the plaintiff has made a choice to proceed in the face of a known danger, to
take his chances that he might not suffer injury as a result of defendant's con-

6. Note, Assumption of Risk Merged with ContributoryNegligence: Anderson v. Ceccardi, 45 OHIo
ST. L. 1059, 1060 (1984).
7. Nichols v. Western Auto Supply Co., Inc., 477 So. 2d 261, 264 (Miss. 1985).
8. See, e.g., Van Eman, Ohios Assumption of Risk: The Deafening Silence, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 661,
679 (1982); Note, Assumption of Risk Merges with ComparativeNegligence: National Marine Services, Inc.
v. Petroleum Services Corp., 31 Lov. L. REv. 400, 404, 411 (1985). Indeed, Professor Fleming James notes:
It will be apparent at once that the whole spirit of [assumption of risk] and of the reasoning
it employs, bears the strong imprint of laissez-faire and its concomitant philosophy of
individualism which has passed its prime .... Small wonder then that assumption of risk
has lost ground as that climate of opinion has undergone modification .... It is likely to
lose more ground as notions of social insurance gain strength and techniques for effecting
broad distribution of enterprise liability are developed.
James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 153 (1952).
9. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in ProductsLiability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 151 (1961). See also
id. at 149.
10. Id.
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duct. The plaintiff having made his choice to accept this risk, there is little reason to shift the loss from where it lies. As Professor Mansfield notes, "[tihe
notion that choice in many situations makes the difference is dug too deep into
the soil of our thinking to be rooted out by any easy generalization [concerning
assumption of risk and comparative negligence]." 11 Moreover, there is nothing
in the enactment of comparative negligence that would, or even should, interfere with the plaintiffs choice.
This paper will explore these concepts and will present an argument that assumption of risk remains vitally important today both in terms of what is and
in terms of what should be.
II.
Whether and to what extent assumption of risk remains a viable defense is
the subject of much confusion. 2 Typical of the confusion among the jurisdictions is the treatment of the defense by the Mississippi Supreme Court. In
Braswell v. Economy Supply Co. ,13 the Mississippi court seemed to have merged
assumption of risk and comparative negligence:
In all probability [application of assumption of risk in a state which has
a comparative negligence statute] defeats the basic intention of the statute,
since it continues an absolute bar in the case of one important, and very
common, type of negligent conduct on the part of the plaintiff ....
All
this goes to say, however, not that there is no such defense as assumption
of risk, but in many cases, at least, where it overlaps and coincides with
14
[comparative]negligence, the rule of that defense should be applied to it.
Although the Braswell court did not abolish assumption of risk, it certainly cast
doubt on the defense. Doubt was also cast on the viability of assumption of
risk in Mississippi in Alley v. PraschakMach. Co. 1 5 There, then Justice Roy
Noble Lee, writing the court's majority opinion, stated:
The writer feels that the assumption of risk issue seldom should be submitted to a jury under Mississippi's Comparative Negligence Law. Where the
assumption of risk doctrine would apply, the negligence of the injured person, for practical purposes, would have to be the sole proximate cause of
the accident, and such issue should be submitted to the jury rather than assumption of risk. 6

11. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17, 22 (1961).
12. Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 229.
13. 281 So. 2d 669 (Miss. 1973).
14. Id. at 676-77.
15. 366 So. 2d 661 (Miss. 1979).
16. Id. at 665 n. 1. Justice Lee's statement is rather curious. He seems to suggest that assumption of
risk should be treated as either 100% fault under the comparative negligence law or as a directed verdict,
for if the issue should not be submitted to the jury, a legal question, unless plaintiffs action was the sole
proximate cause of his injuries, the case has already been decided where assumption of risk has been determined. In either event, the vitality of assumption of risk is questioned.
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Similarly, speaking for the court in Hill v. Dunaway,7 Justice Robertson noted
the movement in other states to merge assumption of risk into the affirmative
defense of comparative negligence and found that such movement "lays bare
the reality that assumption of risk is only an artificial way of denominating a
plaintiffs negligence." 1 8 Despite these indications that assumption of risk has
been, at a minimum, merged with comparative negligence, in another recent
decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed directions: "Regardless of
the feeling of attorneys and judges on assumption of risk, the doctrine has not
been abolished in Mississippi.
...
9
The confusion, both in Mississippi and elsewhere, as to the proper role of
assumption of risk in today's world of comparative negligence has been fueled,
in part, by the failure of the courts and commentators to recognize a consistent
usage of assumption of risk.2 0 Indeed, it has been said that assumption of risk
"has generated so many elusive distinctions that precedent is often of little help." 21
Assumption of risk is generally divided into several categories, the number and
content of which vary from one user to the next .22 Perhaps the most common
system of assumption of risk is that suggested by Harper and James in which
assumption of risk is divided into three categories - (1) primary assumption
of risk, which is really another way of saying the defendant violated no duty,
(2) secondary or implied assumption of risk, where the plaintiff deliberately
chooses to encounter a known risk, and (3) express assumption of risk, where
the plaintiff by spoken or written words expressly agrees to assume the risk
23
of the defendant's conduct.
Division of assumption of risk into such categories is not, however, altogether
helpful and may prove counterproductive. For instance, primary assumption
of risk involves those circumstances where the defendant owes to the plaintiff
no duty which would give rise to a cause of action for injuries suffered. 24 It
arises out of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant and defendant's
25
right to put the choice to the plaintiff as to whether to take or leave the risk.
Where the risk is one the defendant may leave to the choice of the plaintiff and

17. 487 So. 2d 807 (Miss. 1986).
18. Id. at 810 n.l.
19. Nichols v. Western Auto Supply Co., Inc., 477 So. 2d 261, 264 (Miss. 1985). Other commentators
have similarly been confused over the state of affairs in Mississippi. Compare Rosenlund and Killion, supra
note 1, at 266 n.236 and Note, supra note 8, at 405 with Comment, Assumption of the Risk in Alaska after
the Adoption of Comparative Negligence, 6 UCLA-ALASKA L. Rav. 244, 254-55 (1977) and Note, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk - The Case For Their Merger, 56 MINN. L. REv. 47, 70 (1971).
20. Keeton, supra note 9, at 123; Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 232-33; Shaw, The Role of
Assumption of Risk in Systems of Comparative Negligence, 46 INs. CouNs. J. 360, 360 (1979).
21. Shaw, supra note 20, at 360 (quoting Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex. 1975)).
22. E.g., Kennedy, Assumption of the Risk, Comparative Fault and Strict Liability after Rozell, 47 LA.
L. REv. 791, 797 n.34; Keeton, supra note 9, at 130; Rosenlund and Killian, supra note 1, at 233-34.
23. Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 234, 239-40; Kennedy, supra note 22, at 797 n.34.
24. Shaw, supra note 20, at 382.
25. James, supra note 8, at 142.
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the plaintiff so chooses to accept the risk, the defendant discharges his only
duty owing to the plaintiff by warning of the risk.2 6 Use of assumption of risk
in such cases, though, where all we mean to say is that the defendant breached
no duty in the first place, is of little value. Professor Mansfield puts the problem
thusly: A defendant may not be negligent in conducting certain activity if one
in his position would reasonably believe that those approaching his activity will
perceive the risk and take the necessary precautions to avoid injury. Because
of the foreseeability that adequate precautions will be taken, the law in such
case will not find the defendant negligent for undertaking the activity. Where
a particular plaintiff approaches the defendant's activity without knowledge of
the reasonably apparent risk and consequently is injured, the non-negligent conduct of the defendant is not somehow transformed into negligent conduct. By
reasonably believing all passers-by will take adequate precautions, the defendant has acted reasonably, i.e., non-negligently, despite the fact that this particular plaintiff did not take adequate precautions. If assumption of risk is used
solely in this manner, "it serves only the cause of confusion to speak of the
plaintiff's having 'assumed the risk,' as if some independent legal principle, distinct from the non-negligence of the defendant, was operating to defeat liability."27
Similarly, to borrow the example of Professor Robert Keeton, the shortcoming of measuring defendant's duty by plaintiff's conduct is illustrated in the example of a defectively designed motorcycle being used by two people, one of
whom is aware of the defect and the other of whom is ignorant of the defect.
In such a case, the manufacturer has clearly violated a duty toward the ignorant
user. The informed user, however, ordinarily may not recover against the
manufacturer because he voluntarily encountered an appreciated risk. The nonliability of the manufacturer to the informed user, i.e., the lack of duty on the
part of the manufacturer, turns not necessarily on the defendant manufacturer's
conduct, but rather on the plaintiffs conduct. As Professor Keeton concludes,
"[t]he statement that defendant had 'no duty' in these circumstances is at least
misleading ...."28
All this goes to show that assumption of risk is properly a consequence of
the plaintiff's action; "duty" is necessarily a consequence of the defendant's action. In this regard, so long as the outcome of the matter "does not turn on the
circumstance of informed choice by the particular plaintiff who was exposed
to the risk, there seems no need to invoke a special concept of assumption of
risk."2 Rather, the outcome is more properly explained as non-negligence without
reference to assumption of risk. 30 Conversely, where the outcome is dependent
26. Id. at 147.
27. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 19.
28. Keeton, supra note 9, at 161.
29. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 20 n.4.
30. Id. Similarly, as we will see later, the use of express assumption of risk also only interjects confusion into the matter. See infra text accompanying notes 37-45.
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on plaintiffs informed choice, there appears no need to address the problem
as one of no duty or of non-negligence; assumption of risk suffices nicely.
Having reached this conclusion, we are left with assumption of risk in what
has been called the secondary or implied sense and assumption of risk in the
express sense. The focus of the remainder of this paper will be on these two
concepts.
III.
At the heart of the controversy surrounding assumption of risk is the rise of
comparative negligence. Starting with Mississippi in 1910,31 the various jurisdictions began to ameliorate the "all or nothing" consequences of contributory
negligence by enacting comparative negligence laws which apportion a plaintiffs damages between plaintiff and defendant according to relative degrees of
fault.3 2 As noted previously, 31 the comparative negligence enactments vary between "pure" comparative negligence where the plaintiff is allowed to recover
except where his fault is 100% and "modified" comparative negligence where
the plaintiff is allowed to recover except where his fault exceeds some maximum degree, usually fifty percent or fifty-one percent. The growing trend among
the jurisdictions today which have adopted comparative negligence is to hold
that assumption of risk overlaps comparative negligence and to merge the defense
into comparative negligence, thereby considering assumption of risk simply as
another form of negligence. 34 This is particularly so with so-called unreasonable implied/secondary assumption of risk. 35 While the conclusion that assumption of risk overlaps comparative negligence and should either be abolished or
merged into comparative negligence is inviting at first blush, upon closer analysis
it is seen that assumption of risk rests on very different grounds; and comparative negligence and neither one should be consumed by the other. Moreover,
almost without exception, those jurisdictions which have abolished or merged
assumption of risk have curiously retained express assumption of risk, even
though the plaintiff acted unreasonably in expressly assuming the risk.3 6 In essence, however, there is little reason to treat express assumption of risk any
differently from implied/secondary assumption of risk.

31. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 436.
32. Id. at 434-37. Mississippi's comparative negligence statute, for example, is found at Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972).
33. See supra note 5.
34. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 75, 376 A.2d 329, 332 (1977); Rosenlund
and Killion, supra note 1, at 266; Note, supra note 6, at 1060, 1070; Note, supra note 8, at 403, 411.
35. Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 266.
36. Id. at 266-67; Van Eman, supra note 8, at 668; Note, supra note 6, at 1062.
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A.
Express assumption of risk arises where a plaintiff expressly, whether orally
or in writing, agrees to take responsibility for defendant's failure to exercise
the requisite degree of care and to relieve the defendant from the consequences
of otherwise actionable conduct. 37 In short, the plaintiff expressly agrees "to
assume the risk of what would ordinarily be a breach of duty" by the defendant . 8 Despite the controversy surrounding implied/secondary assumption of
risk and the growing call to abolish that form of assumption of risk, there is
very little debate regarding express assumption of risk.39 Even those, such as
Professor Fleming James, who would abolish or merge implied/secondary assumption of risk, advocate the retention of express assumption of risk.4 Treating express assumption of risk differently from implied/secondary assumption
of risk, though, is fundamentally inconsistent and should be avoided.
The basis of assumption of risk, whatever classification is used, is the plaintiffs consent to accept the risk created by the defendant's conduct. 41 The
manifestation of consent giving rise to express assumption of risk appears through
spoken or written words, while implied/secondary assumption of risk derives
its consent from implications inherent in the plaintiffs action. Notwithstanding
that consent may be implied in the latter instance, it is, nevertheless, consent
"in fact." 42 Whether we speak of assumption of risk, then, in terms of contract
(express) or in terms of conduct (implied/secondary), the defendant is relieved
from the consequences of his action by the plaintiffs informed choice to proceed in the face of, and consent to, a known danger created by the defendant's
conduct.43 There is no justification for relieving the defendant of liability simply because the plaintiff manifested his consent through Words - spoken or
written - while imposing liability on him because the plaintiffs consent is
manifested through conduct.4' That plaintiffs consent, real as it is, is manifested in conduct rather than words surely is no reason to shift the loss from where
it lies, viz., with the plaintiff, and it certainly does not make for a more equitable allocation of loss.
Thus, in considering whether to retain assumption of risk, we should not consider express assumption of risk any differently from implied/secondary assumption of risk. The query should rather focus on whether the single principle of
assumption of risk, the plaintiffs informed choice, however manifested, to

37. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 442; Keeton, supranote 9, at 124; Kennedy, supra note 22, at 797; Note,
supra note 6, at 1061-62.
38. James, supra note 8, at 162.
39. Van Eman, supra note 8, at 668.
40. James, supra note 8, at 166.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C comment h (1965); Kennedy, supranote 22, at 803 n. 60.
42. Kennedy, supra note 22, at 803 n.60.
43. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 31 & n.16.
44. Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 240.
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encounter and accept the consequences of the defendant's conduct, is of such
value as to be retained as a means of precluding the plaintiff from shifting his
loss. 4 5

B.
Assumption of risk involves the plaintiff's consent to assume the consequences
of the defendant's otherwise actionable conduct. The decision to proceed in the
face of such conduct, and to consent to the danger created by such conduct may
objectively be seen as being either reasonable or unreasonable, much like conduct constituting comparative negligence. That is to say, whether we are speaking
of assumption of risk or of comparative negligence, in so consenting to the risk
created by the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff may have acted as the ordinarily prudent man would have acted, in which case we say his conduct was reasonable, or his actions may have gone beyond that of the ordinarily prudent man,
in which case we say his conduct was unreasonable. Where plaintiffs conduct
is deemed objectively unreasonable and assumption of risk is otherwise appropriate, assumption of risk would act as a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery, whereas
comparative negligence would only reduce plaintiffs recovery in proportion
to his degree of fault. Seizing upon this apparent inconsistency, critics of assumption of risk would find assumption of risk to be simply another form of
comparative negligence and would apportion damages strictly according to fault.'
The argument advanced by the critics in this regard is based essentially on
the notion that the "all or nothing" result of assumption of risk conflicts, or as
the critics say, overlaps, the "more equitable" fault-based comparative negligence laws. 4 7 Since application of assumption of risk would, the argument goes,

45. This is not to say that there are no differences between express assumption of risk and implied/secondary
assumption of risk. However, such differences are of no moment to our discussion. For example, as Professor Mansfield notes, in contract cases and other like cases, such as express assumption of risk, where the
parties have "averted to their future legal relations," most probably they have considered more carefully the
risks inherent in the circumstances. Consequently, the risks for which a defendant will be relieved in cases
of express assumption of risk may be more general risks than where a defendant is relieved from liability
on account of implications from the plaintiffs conduct, which would require a more particularized knowledge
of the injury-producing risk. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 30 n. 16a. While a greater degree of knowledge
of the risk - or perhaps more precisely, a greater degree of proof of knowledge of the risk - may be required with implied/secondary assumption of risk, such a distinction poses no fundamental threat to the conclusion reached in the text that express assumption of risk and implied/secondary assumption of risk be,
in the main, treated no differently.
46. E.g., James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 185-86 n.4 (1968).
47. That assumption of risk merely overlaps comparative negligence is not a sufficient reason of itself
to abolish assumption of risk. The law affords many instances where two or more remedies are available
for the same conduct. It is only where the overlap results in antagonism to the policies underlying comparative negligence that abolition should be considered. See, e.g., Martin v. George Hyman Const. Co., 395
A.2d 63, 69 (D.C. 1978) and infra note 48.
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contravene the comparative negligence enactments, assumption of risk must give
way to comparative negligence.4 As one critic argues,
The most credible argument relating to the dismissal of the defense is that
it totally undermines the purpose of comparative negligence. Such purpose
is, of course, to apportion damages on the basis of fault, thereby short
circuiting the primitive "all or nothing" result of a pure contributory negligence system.49
Similarly, one court addressing the issue has charged that since assumption of
risk operates as a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery, "a defendant can circumvent the comparative negligence statute entirely by asserting the assumption
of risk defense alone."50
Assumption of risk, however, rests on very different theoretical grounds than
does comparative negligence. As such, it neither conflicts with the policies
underlying comparative negligence nor does its application circumvent the comparative negligence enactments. Comparative negligence rests on the plaintiffs
failure to exercise reasonable care. It measures the plaintiffs conduct objectively, against that of the "reasonable man." Assumption of risk eschews any
such notion of fault or negligence and rests on the plaintiffs informed consent
to encounter the risk created by the defendant's dangerous conduct. It is measured subjectively: what did this plaintiff know and to what did he consent? 1
Despite suggestions to the contrary,5 2 these differences are quite significant in
several respects.
At the outset, it is apparent at once that the critics' argument regarding overlap does not address ev ery instance of assumption of risk. Assumption of risk
and comparative negligence overlap, if at all, only where both defenses are applicable to the same conduct. That is to say, only where the plaintiffs conduct
can be characterized as either assumption of risk or comparative negligence
is there any claim to overlap. Since comparative negligence is concerned only
with the plaintiffs unreasonable conduct, the argument regarding overlap does
not extend to those instances in which the plaintiff assumes the risk of the defen-

48. There is in the critics' argument the hint that the judicially created defense of assumption of risk is
pre-empted by the comparative negligence enactments, at least where the comparative negligence law is legislatively created. See, e.g., Van Eman, supra note 8, at 676. As will be seen in greater detail, see infra text
accompanying notes 41-66, assumption of risk and comparative negligence enactments do not conflict in
purpose or effect. Whether the two defenses conflict or not, though, does not settle the matter. Martin v.
George Hyman Const. Co., 395 A.2d 63, 69 (D.C. 1978) ("The effect of a statute or regulation depends
upon an analysis not only of the policies of the enactment but also the relation of those policies to each of
the defenses [viz., comparative negligence and assumption of risk] individually."). Thus, we must inquire
into whether the policies of assumption of risk and comparative negligence conflict.
49. Van Eman, supra note 8, at 676.
50. Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 113, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983).
51. Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 231; Note, supranote 6, at 1067; Note, ContributoryNegligence and Assumption of Risk - The Case for Their Merger, 56 MINN. L. REv. 47, 51 (1971). See also
Shurley v. Hoskins, 271 So. 2d 439, 443 (Miss. 1973); Daves v. Reed, 222 So. 2d 411, 414 (Miss. 1969).
52. See Note, supra note 51, at 51.
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dant's conduct but acts reasonably in doing so. Assumption of risk would not
frustrate the purposes of comparative negligence in such circumstances for the
simple reason that comparative negligence would not apply in the first instance.
The difference in the two defenses is also seen in the standard to be applied
to each - an objective standard to comparative negligence and a subjective standard to assumption of risk. With its subjective standard, assumption of risk looks
to the individual and focuses on individual choice. By definition, at the time
of acting - and, it might be added, at the time of foregoing avoidance of the
risk - the risk-assuming plaintiff, with full knowledge of the potential for harm,
makes the decision to proceed notwithstanding the risk. It is a deliberate choice
made by the particular individual. In this regard, it has been said that whether
the plaintiff will accept the risk and proceed is determined by his own reasonableness assessment: "It seems axiomatic that an individual's willingness to consent to risks in a situation (or relationship) will be in direct proportion to the
relative benefits he will be able to derive from placing himself in that situation."5 3 In assumption of risk, the plaintiff makes his own assessment as to
whether he should take his chances based on a comparison of the benefit he
would gain on the one hand, and the likelihood of harm on the other.
Comparative negligence stands or falls on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct. In cases where assumption of risk is also applicable, or indeed
in any case, whether the plaintiff has acted in such a manner as to be negligent
also involves an assessment of reasonableness:
The distinction between reasonable and unreasonable assumption of risk
is determined by the ever present balancing of interest test. If the utility
or societal advantages of the plaintiffs conduct outweigh its risks, then the
conduct is reasonable. If the utility or societal advantages of the plaintiffs
conduct are outweighed by its risks, then the conduct is unreasonable.'
However, unlike assumption of risk, the assessment of reasonableness for comparative negligence purposes is determined by reference to what the ordinarily
prudent man would do under similar circumstances. Thus, in cases where assumption of risk gives way to comparative negligence, the plaintiff acts based
on his individual and personal assessment of the advantages he will gain and
risks he may suffer, yet that very same action is judged based on an assessment
of a very different nature, viz., the reasonable man. Such a formula skews the
scales in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as the plaintiff is given
two bites at the apple - the first when he chooses whether to proceed based
on his own reasonableness assessment and the second when he is allowed to
second guess his first choice by applying a reasonable man standard at the
courthouse.
53. Shaw, supra note 20, at 373.
54. Van Eman, supra note 8, at 665-66.
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The distinction between reasonable and unreasonable conduct gives rise to
another problem in merging assumption of risk and comparative negligence.
It is argued that where assumption of risk overlaps comparative negligence,
i.e., where the plaintiff's assumption is unreasonable, the question of compara55
tive negligence and not assumption of risk should be submitted to the jury.
Since reasonable assumption of risk does not overlap or otherwise conflict with
notions of comparative negligence, though, the problem arises as to when the
reasonableness of plaintiffs actions, a question of fact to be decided by the jury,
is to be determined. If reasonable minds could differ5 6 as to whether plaintiff
acted reasonably, the question of whether plaintiffs assumption of risk was
reasonable must be submitted to the jury, like the question of plaintiffs comparative negligence. In such cases, both questions must still be submitted to
57
the jury despite merger, and the jury must employ a several-step analysis.
Perhaps the most significant manner in which assumption of risk and comparative negligence differ, though, is that- assumption of risk is based on the
plaintiffs consent and comparative negligence is based on the plaintiffs fault.
This difference is significant in two respects: (1) consent and fault are distinct
concepts which cannot easily be compared in a comparative negligence system; and (2) principles of consent and choice carry with them certain significant overriding considerations.
In the typical comparative fault system, the plaintiffs damages are diminished
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him.' His negligence,
or fault, then is compared to that of the defendant. Where assumption of risk
is thrown into the equation, the comparison is one of fault and consent. As one
commentator has noted though, the two are quite different concepts: "Consent,
in and of itself, is not based upon fault or departure from the reasonable person
standard; it is essentially contractual in nature." 59 Unlike comparative negligence, there is, for instance, lacking from assumption of risk "any inquiry into
whether plaintiffs behavior was a proximate cause of his injury. " 60 Comparing
such concepts with different theoretical bases in a comparative negligence formula
is fiction at best:
To ask the fact-finder to determine how much of the plaintiffs injury is
due to the defendant's negligence and how much is due to the plaintiffs
promise to hold the defendant harmless is, to use Prosser's simile, like ask-

55. E.g., Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So. 2d 669, 677 (Miss. 1973); Richardson v. Clayton
& Lambert Mfg. Co., 657 F. Supp. 751, 753 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
56. See, e.g., Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1978).
57. One such process is suggested in Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 275.
58. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-204 (1956).
59. Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 270.
60. Shaw, supra note 20, at 387.
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ing the fact-finder to balance "ten pounds of sugar .. .against half-past
61
two in the afternoon."

In this regard, at least one commentator, conceding that it would be "difficult
to apply to assumption of risk a rule of proration according to relative degrees
of fault, as is done in some forms of comparative negligence," suggests that
such problems of administration should result in "equal sharing among co-authors
of the harm, like that applicable to contribution among tortfeasors" rather than
in a complete bar.6 2 Such an approach has at least two shortcomings. First,
many states which have adopted comparative negligence would completely bar
a plaintiff from recovery where his proportion of fault is fifty percent or greater.63 Thus, in those states, to be consistent with the comparative negligence
enactment, an equal sharing of harm would bar the plaintiffs recovery. Second,
since an apples and oranges comparison cannot determine what portion of the
plaintiffs damages were brought about by the defendant's substandard conduct
rather than the plaintiffs consent, imposing an inflexible fifty percent liability
rule on the defendant may well subject him to liability for which he was not
responsible. In such circumstances where liability cannot be accurately apportioned, rather than impose on the merely careless defendant liability for which
he may not be responsible, would not the more equitable rule place the complete loss on the party who has voluntarily consented to the consequences of
the entire risk? Indeed, as will be seen next, consent and choice carry with them
certain significant consequences.
That individual freedom and choice is the rock upon which our nation and
our legal system is founded is beyond dispute. It is said in this regard that
"[e]mbedded in our political philosophy is a fundamental judgment that events
should be ordered according to individual choice."" It is, after all, the individual
who is better able to survey and assess his own needs, 65 and it is this individualism, our diversity of wants and needs, that makes a particularly risky activity
the source of great satisfaction to one individual but a source of great fear to
another. I would not, for example, take much pleasure out of sky diving, but
a number of individuals apparently do. For this reason, "the common good"
is better achieved through "individual choice rather than governmental regulation."66

With respect to plaintiffs, these principles result in two very important consequences. First, the plaintiff may neither "be compelled to do what he does

61. Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 270-71 (quoting Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California,
L. REV. 183, 225 & n.240 (1949)).
62. Keeton, supra note 9, at 159-60.
63. See Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 264-65 n.233, for a list of those states which completely
bar a plaintiff where his fault is fifty percent or greater.
64. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 23.
65. Id. at 24.
66. Id.
37
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not choose to do nor prevented from doing what he does choose to do." 67 Where
the plaintiff is denied the choice to expose himself to a risk or is denied the
advantages gained by that choice, we have acted "to suspend the operation of
that very process of free choice upon which . : . the hopes of realizing the individual and common good are primarily founded."6
However, a second consequence results to the plaintiff from the principle of
individual choice, and that is, having made his choice, "the law will not compensate the plaintiff for those results of his choice that he finds undesirable." 6"
In assumption of risk cases, the plaintiff has made an assessment regarding the
relative benefits he will derive from an activity and the costs, or risks, of obtaining those benefits .70 Electing to proceed and to not avoid those risks, the
plaintiff has made the choice that to him the advantages to be gained from going forward, rather than remaining safely where he is, outweigh the potential
for harm. At that point, the plaintiff is all too willing that the defendant provide
him with the election:
The plaintiff was satisfied enough with the defendant's conduct when he
hoped to gain by it. Only when things have gone badly does he complain
that the defendant has violated a duty owing him and demand compensation for the consequences. The plaintiff wanted something for nothing,
but
71
when a cost was exacted seeks to cast this upon the defendant.
As Justice James Robertson of the Mississippi Supreme Court stated in a somewhat different context, "It would be irrational in my view for our law to allow
such free choice and at once allow one injured as a result of exercising that
choice to recover damages from the one who enabled him to exercise that
choice."72
Notions of choice do not go so far as to afford the plaintiff, who once stood
at the threshold of action armed with both knowledge of the risks ahead and
the opportunity to avoid those risks, the ability to cast back upon the defendant
the cost of his choice. The more equitable approach is to enforce the "fundamental
principle" of assumption of risk that "where the plaintiff has voluntarily and
intelligently consented to relieve the defendant of liability for certain known
risks, the plaintiffs choice should be enforced." 73 The differences in compara-

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.at 25.
70. See supra text accompanying note 53.
71. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 73.
72. Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 361 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., dissenting).
This conclusion is particularly true with respect to those instances where the defendant has acted on the plaintiffs
willingness to accept the risk of the defendant's conduct or when the defendant reasonably believes that the
plaintiff was willing to accept the risks. Indeed, in such instances the case takes on notions of estoppel. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 25, 30; Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 245.
73. Rosenlund and Killion, supra note 1, at 255.
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tive negligence and assumption of risk being too great, there simply is nothing
in the comparative negligence laws which should be allowed to uproot this
fundamental principle.
C.
As we have previously seen, the critics' argument that assumption of risk frustrates the policies of comparative negligence does not implicate reasonable assumption of risk, where the plaintiff has assumed the risk of the defendant's
conduct but has acted, objectively speaking, reasonably in doing so. Undaunted,
the critics continue their attack by arguing that reasonable assumption of risk
must be abolished to "prevent the illogical and grossly inequitable result of
preventing recovery by a plaintiff who acts reasonably, but allowing it to a plaintiff who acts unreasonably .74 To the extent, then, that unreasonable assumption of risk retains a separate and independent existence, this argument loses
all force of persuasion. Assuming for the moment, though, that unreasonable
assumption of risk is merely another way of denominating comparative negligence, the retention of reasonable assumption of risk is neither illogical nor
grossly inequitable.
When we speak of assumption of risk, we are concerned not with the plaintiffs knowledge alone, but also with "the quality of the conduct of one who
acts with the benefit of the greater knowledge." 75 At issue in assumption of
risk is what the plaintiff does with this knowledge:
The fundamental consideration underlying the doctrine [of assumption of
risk] as it is applied to noncontractual situations is that one should not be
permitted knowingly and voluntarily to incur an obvious risk of harm when
he has the ability to avoid doing so, and then hold another person responsi76
ble for his injury.
Indeed, the plaintiff who ventures forth with knowledge of the potential harm
is "not merely contributorily negligent":" "[O]ne who 'sees, knows, understands
and appreciates' what he is doing ...is worlds apart from one who unwittingly and unsuspectingly falls prey to another's negligence." 78 The risk-assuming
plaintiff having greater culpability than the merely negligent plaintiff, it is neither
illogical nor inequitable to apply a more "demanding standard" to the knowledgeable plaintiff than his "less learned contemporaries." 79 Moreover, though some

74. Van Eman, supra note 8, at 680. See also Note, supra note 8, at 405 (citing Braswell v. Economy
Supply Co. , 281 So. 2d 669 (Miss. 1973)); Note, supra note 6, at 1071-72; Note, supra note 51, at 57.
75. Keeton, supra note 9, at 159; Shaw, supra note 20, at 368.
76. Griffin v. Griffin, 282 S.C. 288, 294, 318 S.E.2d 24, 28-29 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting 65A C.J.S.
Negligence § 174(1) (1966)).
77. Riley v. Davison Const. Co., Inc., 381 Mass. 432, 438, 409 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (1980).
78. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 76, 376 A.2d 329, 333 (1977).
79. Keeton, supra note 9, at 158-59.
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argue otherwise, 80 retention of reasonable assumption of risk despite the merger of unreasonable assumption of risk with comparative negligence does not
encourage plaintiffs to act negligently. Although knowledgeable plaintiffs who
voluntarily consent to the risk of harm will be barred from recovery, it is unlikely that plaintiffs will intentionally remain aloof to dangers simply to retain
the hope of recovering monetary damages, particularly where such damages
are not likely to fully compensate a plaintiff for personal injuries. 8 1
CONCLUSION

Despite a growing trend to eliminate assumption of risk from our jurisprudence, the defense retains an inherent worth justifying, even demanding, its
continued existence. In the final analysis, notwithstanding the development of
comparative negligence, where assumption of risk is applicable, the plaintiff,
although able to avoid the risk proceeding offers, has made a conscious, informed
choice to accept such risk and to proceed in harm's way. Having made such
a choice and given his consent, it is neither illogical nor inequitable to require
the plaintiff to accept the consequences, which so easily could have been avoided,
of such a decision. Surely our law should, at a minimum, require us to take
greater responsibility toward protecting ourselves from ourselves. The law so
requires where we expressly agree to assume the risk; there is no reason to
require otherwise where our assumption, though implied from conduct, is
nevertheless as real.
80. E.g., Note, supra note 6, at 1072.
81. I would, for example, find the exchange of even one of my arms for any sum of money a poor
bargain indeed.

